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Abstract 
 
Do financial regulation advisors help their clients become more profitable? In this paper, 
we present a model where financial service firms may add to their own compliance teams 
or hire outside compliance advisors. We derive the conditions under which a financial 
services firm will want to hire a compliance services company, and show how much 
money they should spend. Financial services firms in competitive locations like Hong 
Kong and Singapore will particularly benefit (at least in the short run) from their services. 
We also show that their advice may lead to an embarrass de riches – whereby the lower 
compliance costs and higher profit advantages they confer may lead to more regulation. 
Regulators may furthermore tighten regulation – with the expectation that financial 
service firms will adapt somehow. We present a fresh perspective on the Menon 
Hypothesis, deriving conditions under which financial regulations help the 
competitiveness of an international financial centre. We provide five potential policy 
responses for dealing with ever ratcheting financial regulations.   
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A Theory of Financial Services Competition, Compliance and Regulation 
Bryane Michael, Joseph Falzon and Ajay Shamdasani 
 
Introduction 
 
Since 2008, financial regulators have imposed large swaths of new regulations on 
financial institutions. To adapt to these new regulations – from Dodd-Frank to EMIR – 
financial institutions have sought advice from a new class of infomediary. These 
information intermediaries specialise in providing regular regulatory monitoring, 
briefings, advice on, and even in-house computerised knowledge management and 
collaboration tools which allows these financial firms’ lawyers, compliance staff, auditors 
and even external advisors to collaborate and exchange regulatory information. 
Thompson Reuters and CAPCO represent two well-known names in this space. Yet, the 
industry for providing information, advice and value-added services around financial 
regulation grows. How do compliance advisors help financial institutions adapt to 
financial regulation? How does such adaption affect regulators’ decision to regulate in the 
first place?    
 
In this paper, we model the way financial regulation advisors help improve financial 
institutions’ profitability. We show that expanding a financial institution’s compliance 
capacity may result in benefits to the individual financial services firm. We also show 
that in the presence of competition between financial services firms, competitive 
pressures lead to expanding compliance productivity – and thus compliance capacity. 
Regulators who observe such increasing compliance productivity impose more 
regulations. Eventually, the growth of new financial regulations and compliance 
productivity may equalize over time. Yet, in the short-run, over-zealous regulators 
(expecting future compliance productivity) may impose profit-damaging regulations – 
harming the competitiveness of the financial industry they regulate.   
 
We organise our paper as follows. The first section reviews some of the relevant 
literature – highlighting the lack of models for thinking through the interplay between 
compliance sector development and financial regulation. We also present in some detail a 
measure of the “level” of financial regulations – a key variable for any thinking about 
regulations in our model and testing it someday. The second section presents the set-up 
for our model – a basic profit maximisation problem with a labour/regulation constraint 
and a profit/labour constraint. Basically a two-sector model, we divide financial 
regulation advisors into in-house lawyers and outsourced compliance service providers. 
The third section presents our dynamics of competition in our model – showing how 
financial firm competition leads to higher productivity in the compliance sector. The 
fourth section provides the meat of the paper – showing the way regulation and financial 
service providers’ productivity interact over time... both indirectly responding to changes 
in financial firms’ profits. The fifth section presents strategies for testing some of our key 
propositions empirically. The brief sixth section provides 4 policy options. The final 
section concludes.   
 
 
Overview of the Stylized Facts and Relevant Literature 
 
A relatively well-developed industry exists to inform financial services firms about 
changing financial laws. Services like Thompson Reuters’ Accelus, the Policy and 
Regulatory Report (PaRR), CAPCO, Bloomberg and Wolters Kluwer represent some of 
the better-known stand-alone service providers.1 Most the top-tier global law, consulting 
and audit firms also provide their financial institutional clients with regular updates on 
legislative and regulatory changes affecting their business. Some of the names appearing 
on the first page of a Google search include Baker & McKenzie, McKinsey, and KPMG.2  
Yet, few economists have studied this segment of the larger market for  professional 
services. What drives financial institutions to seek out third-party information about 
changes in financial laws in their jurisdictions? What drives the decision to monitor 
developments in-house rather than outsource such monitoring? What private benefits 
accrue to financial institutions which engage these financial service providers – and how 
does the rate of change in financial laws affect the value of their advice? 
 
The quantification of financial regulations 
 
Different jurisdictions have quantifiably different levels, changes and types of financial 
regulation. In recent years, scholars like Barth et al. (2013) have made strides in 
developing quantitative measurements related to various aspects of financial law across 
countries. Their measure assigns numerical values to various aspects of each country’s 
banking law. For example, their proxy for a country which imposes a minimum capital 
entry requirement based on the bank’s business registers a 1 if the country imposes such a 
requirement (or 0 otherwise). In such a way, they “break up” countries’ banking laws into 
over 900 quantifiable aspects. With quantifiable proxies for a country’s banking law, 
economists can develop indices which track the “level” countries’ banking regulations, 
changes and the quantitative differences between specific aspects of banking law.3 These 
data have led to an explosion of econometric studies looking at the way banking 
regulation affects various aspects of the financial sector and other parts of the economy 
(Cihak et al., 2013; Vatnick, 2008).   
 
Such quantification allows economists to model the stock, changes and quantitatively 
different aspects of financial law across countries. As shown in equation (1), the easiest 
way to describe the level of country i’s regulations consists of assigning each of a 
country’s n financial law provisions with a number m at time t. For example, r3 =1 if the 
third provision measures (a regulation requiring banks to file a suspicious transactions 
report equals 1 for amounts over $10,000, 2 for amounts over $50,000 and so forth). 
Imagining that we can simply order countries alphabetically (or by any other procedure), 
                                                 
1 A simple Google search on the terms “track financial regulatory changes Asia” provides a quick and 
impartial overview of the major service providers.   
2 We cite only the names appearing on the first page of a Google search to keep our citation of examples 
impersonal. Our mention of specific companies does not imply endorsement or criticism.   
3 We put “level” in quotes because most legal scholars, and even many economists, would balk at mapping 
a complex corpus of laws into a simple measure. We do not pass normative judgement on such a number. 
We only positively assert that economists can develop – and use in models – such a number.  
equation (2) shows the difference between country i’s banking regulation and country 
(i+1) on the list at time t. Equation (3) illustrates how one might get a feel for the 
difference in provisions across countries by looking at differences in specific provisions 3 
and 4 between country 1 with countries 2 and 3. Clearly, with such data, the economist 
can compute curls, find orthogonal vectors and engage in a number of other techniques 
aimed at describing differences in regulatory provisions between countries.  
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What do these differences look like? Figure 1a and 1b shows the way a simple measure 
of banking regulation across countries has changed over time. Between 1999 and 2011, 
the Seychelles’, Moldova’s and Korea’s financial regulation became increasingly 
“stricter” (as defined by Barth et. al.’s scale). Romania, El Salvador and Brazil 
significantly loosened their financial regulation during the same period. With a proxy for 
the “level” (and thus by computation the rate of change) of financial regulation, scholars 
can draw conclusions about how such levels affect regulatory costs, costs of compliance 
and other factors (Jackson, 2007). Such data even allow scholars like La Porta et al. 
(2006) to smugly describe “what works in securities laws.”  
 
Figure 1a: Change in Overall Restrictions on Bank Activities from 1999 to 
2011
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The f igure show s the extent of restrictiveness of bank regulations (as measured by a proxy w hich ranges from 4 to 
16). The Seychelles' change of 6 points on this 16 point scale indicates very signif icant increasing restrictiveness. 
Source: Barth et al. (2012).
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Figure 1b: Change in Overall Restrictions on Bank Activities from 1999 to 2011
The f igure show s the extent of restrictiveness of bank regulations (as measured by a proxy w hich ranges from 4 to 
16). Romania's change of 8 points on this 16 point scale indicates very signif icant decreasing restrictiveness. 
Source: Barth et al. (2012).
 
 
Such proxies also allow scholars like Cunningham and Zaring (2010) and others to 
explore the similarities and differences in countries’ banking and securities regulation. 
What would such a grouping look like in practice? Figure 2 shows the extent of similarity 
between various jurisdictions’ banking regulation. Using clustering analysis – a 
procedure which divides data into groups depending on similarities in the variance of 
banking provision scores – we see roughly four major groups. The first group, shown in 
dark blue, represents the major markets and banking centres. The second group, shown in 
slightly lighter blue, represents large, emerging markets like Mexico, and Russia as well 
as other OECD member countries like Canada and Australia. The third group represents 
alternative financial centres like Switzerland and Malaysia. The fourth cluster represents 
the few off-shore centres like Lichtenstein and Jersey. Despite whether we agree with the 
data or their interpretation – the fact remains that financial regulations can be quantified, 
scaled and compared. We show in the appendix how these data can be scaled onto the 
unit line. 
 
Figure 2: Major Groupings of Banking Regulation 
(using factor analysis) 
 
The figure shows the grouping of countries based on similarities and differences in their 2012 banking law. 
We used the World Bank’s “scoring” of bank regulation along the over 900 dimensions they quantify. We 
then use factor analysis to identify groups of countries based on similarities in the variances of these scores.  
Source: authors, based on data provided by Cihak et al. (2013).   
 
The market for legal advice 
 
Academics have failed to look at closely the market for legal services in general – much 
less the sub-sector dealing with the supply of financial services compliance advisory 
services. Theorising about the size of the legal sector – and related market segments such 
as those offering specialist news and advice about financial law – has remained confined 
to very specific situations.4 For Galanter and Henderson (2008), they seek to explain the 
size and structure of the legal sector as the result of tournaments between lawyers. 
Publishing in the law journal setting, but deeply inspired by economic analysis, the 
authors show how the competitive interaction of lawyers helps determine the supply and 
cost of legal advice. Emons (2000) provides a similar type of analysis, looking at the 
level of legal services provided in a contingency-based pay contracting environment. He 
finds that lawyers have incentives to provide insufficient effort -- suggesting that a 
market distortion results in excess demand in a trial lawyer setting. Yet, by far, the 
traditional approach to modelling demand for legal advice consists of using the extent of 
commercial or personal conflict as the driver of demand for legal advisors’ services 
(Iossa and Jullien, 2009). These approaches provide few insights when modelling the 
demand for lawyers providing advice about complying with financial laws.  
 
Two flavours of models provide the closest analogue for our work. First, Garicano and 
Hubbard (2009) describe the how legal “niches” (like banking and securities law) 
develop as a function of overall market size and the size of a legal specialisation. They 
show that law firms do not group relatively unrelated practices (to diversify risk) and that 
lawyers tend to specialise. They show that transactions costs usually encourage lawyers 
to specialise – suggesting that any “financial services compliance sector” should grow 
over time due to a size effect. Second, Olsen (1999) looks at the way a stock of 
regulations affects the development of intermediaries who earn money by helping 
companies understand and comply with these regulations in a particular industry. In his 
study, he looks specifically at the stock of product health and safety regulations and the 
way such a stock of regulations affects compliance in the US Food and Drug 
Administration FDA-regulated industries. Olsen focuses more on the regulations 
themselves rather than the intermediary industry which arises to reduce the administrative 
burden (namely the transactions costs) of these regulations. Yet, no studies seem to 
bridge the gap in these two literatures.  
 
The literature suffers from four lacunae for understanding how the financial sector 
compliance industry develops over time. First, “compliance” addresses a range of 
services, from simply broadcasting regulatory novelties to financial services firms (at one 
                                                 
4 Part of such a lacuna comes from the lack of data. Authors like Tsolakis (2014) provide a financial 
snapshot of the legal services industry in the UK. However, these largely anecdotal accounts, which mix 
stories and pieces of data collected from a range of sources, do not provide scholars with sufficiently 
rigorous foundations for study.   
end of the spectrum) to providing specific assistance for complying with a specific 
provision like money-laundering-related know-your-customer rules (at the other end of 
the spectrum). Any model looking at the individuals and undertakings which provide 
legal information and advice to financial services firms must depict a “matching 
function” for translating regulation into financially profitable advice. In other words, a 
model must treat regulation as an input into financial services organisations’ production 
function (like labour, capital, intermediate inputs and so forth).5 Scholars like Silver 
(2008) look at the effect regulation plays on the market for legal advice. Yet, few 
scholars have written about the market for legal advice about regulation. 
 
Second, given the fungibility and diversity of legal advisors, any model would need to 
divide the market for advisors into insiders (in-house lawyers) and outsiders (external or 
outsourced compliance advisors). Such a model must thus describe the boundaries of the 
firm (both the compliance/law firm and the financial services firm). Authors like 
Krishnan (2007) have looked at the factors driving compliance and legal advisory 
outsourcing. Yet, the talk in the law reviews has not made its way into the economics 
journals.   
 
Third, such a model must show how these compliance professionals evolve over time – 
particularly in response to evolving regulation, much less considering the endogenous 
determination of regulation and compliance effort/productivity. Helleinera and Pagliaria 
(2011), in their review of research about international financial law, lament the lack of 
theorisation about fragmentation of, compliance with, and development of, such financial 
law. Put simply, we have few models about how national regulators make financial law. 
We have even fewer models of the compliance processes used by banks, financial 
institutions and other economic actors. The literature tends to view “compliance” as a 
binary variable – comply or don’t. Scholars have yet to model the cost of compliance.  
Scholars like Akhigbe and Martin (2006) and Jain and Rezaee (2010) look at the impacts 
of the compliance decision. Yet, viewing compliance as an economic input, with costs, 
productivity, opportunity costs vis-a-vis capital and labour remains alien to lawyers and 
economists alike.  
 
Model Set-Up: How Regulation affects Compliance Spending  
 
We start by modelling how financial regulation affects a financial service firm’s profits. 
The financial service firm’s production consists of generating some quantity of service 
(which we label as Q) and earns a rate of return for the loans, services or any other Q you 
wish to imagine. That return i represents a proportion of the value of the services the firm 
offers. As shown in equation (4), the cost of compliance comes from transforming a stock 
of regulations R in a convex investment function I(R) and “mixing” them with service 
provision. Reflecting real-life financial services, the firm “attaches” regulatory 
                                                 
5 Most economists, to the extent they model regulations, treat regulation as a constraint or barrier to 
production. In fact, regulation contained enshrined instructions for accomplishing many regulated tasks. As 
such, the codified disembodied knowledge enshrined in a country’s massive corpus of financial law 
represents a valid factor of production, as important as a computer code or marketing knowledge.  
monitoring, compliance advice, and other activities (which naturally depend on the level 
of regulations R) to the services it creates.  
 
QRIiQ )(−=π          (4) 
 
Our treatment of the way firms transform regulations into profits represents one of the 
most novel aspects of our model. The parameter a represents the productivity by which 
financial firms transform regulations into costs (and thus profits).6 The term (1-α) 
reflects the marginal cost/productivity of in-house lawyers transforming regulations into
costs. Financial firms use a mix of in-house lawyers L and outside compliance advisors
to generate transform regulations into costs. As per authors like Dehnad and Dehnad 
(2013), the term τ represents the interaction between this advice – where spending may 
consist of technology which helps different departments of a financial services firm pull
together information from a compliance expert (for example). We deliberately and 
blatantly leave capital out of the model to focus on the way financial use lawyers, rather
than capital.
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s of lawyers.   
7 Revenues growing linearly, costs potentially growing exponentially, and 
financial firms also need to dish out money for two different type
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where 0>α>1, R≥0, Q≥0, and (i, a, L, C, τ) ≥0.    
   
These financial service firms operate under two constraints. First, as shown in equation 
(6), firms will always hire a number or labour-equivalent units of in-house lawyers L and 
engage consultants C to deal with the existing stock of regulations R. We can think of the 
lawyers’ productivity (γ) and consultants’ productivity θ as geometrically converting 
manpower into pages of compliance. The terms a and b linearly convert this labour into 
regulation-related compliance. Thus the way to read equation (6) would be that the 
number of pages of regulations (on the left-hand side) exceeds or equals the number of 
effective pages of compliance (on the right-hand side). Equation (7) requires financial 
service firms’ profits to exceed the amount paid for lawyers w and compliance 
consultants c, as well as some minimum required profit level πmin. Such a minimum profit 
level represents opportunity cost or a minimum defined profit level for the industry – and 
firms earning less go out of business or into other business lines.  
 
ϑγ
ϑγ C
bLaR +≥          (6) 
                                                 
6 We show shortly that a serves a dual purpose in our model – as in-house lawyers’ productivity. Thus, as 
they become more productive, they become more costly and reduce profits. We discuss this view of 
lawyers as a cost-centre later.  
7 Readers looking to extend or criticize the model could view Q as a function of capital K. The chosen 
functional form would have different implications for the way the firm deploys capital. Similarly, the firm 
works in the crevices where unprofitable regulation does not chock-off the firms profitable activity. We do 
not constrain Q as revenue grows linearly but costs increase geometrically, guaranteeing a maximum level 
of profitable production at some quantity Q.  
cCwL ++≥ minππ         (7) 
 
Financial service firms maximise their profits, subject to the constraints that compliance 
spending imposes on them. Equation (8) shows the maximisation problem, where 
financial firms adjust their quantity produced, number of lawyers, consultants and the 
opportunity cost of extra regulations and profits. Why does the same parameter a enter 
two times? Lawyer’s ability to turn man-hours into pages of regulatory compliance 
equals the same factor which turns regulation into costs. As lawyers become more 
productive on the constraint side, they become more costly on the production function 
side. This novel formulation reflects the standard view that blossoming legal and 
compliance departments inside of financial firms represent a large (but necessary) drag 
on the organisation in a way that outside compliance workers do not. Given the 
nonlinearities involved, can not yet solve L and C completely. However, we can solve for 
the linear bits (as shown in equations (10) and (11) and provide the implicit solution for 
the non-linear part as shown in equation (9).   
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What does the solution to this non-linear system of equations look like? Figure 3 
illustrates two cases showing how changes in external factors can either increase or 
decrease the amount of compliance advisory services that financial services firms may 
require.8 On the left-hand side of the figure, we show a base case – setting most of the 
parameter values to one. On that graph, we show the balance between in-house counsel 
advisory services and external compliance advisory for a fixed level of regulation. At the 
optimum level of in-house staffing, the trade-off between in-house lawyers and the 
amount of external compliance services increases steeply. A large number of in-house 
lawyers are needed to compensate for a relatively small increase in external advisory. At 
the optimum level of external compliance advisory, more consulting provides a poor 
substitute for in-house expertise. The equilibrium balance between internal and external 
staff – for this base case parameterization – consists of roughly 2 consultants for every 
one in-house lawyer. If the base case holds as a description of the relationship between 
in-house counsel and external compliance consultants, before taking the effect of profits 
                                                 
8 The figure shows solutions for equations (10) and (11) only. We want to provide an intuition for the way 
several of the first order conditions work together before using the others.  
and complementarities into account, financial services firms should encourage far 
more external advice than they retain in in-house legal advisory.  
 
Figure 3: Changes to In-House Counsel and External Compliance Advisors 
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Even minor changes to the base model shows how the proportion of in-house lawyers to 
outside compliance consulting changes. On the right hand panel, we show an increase in 
the cost of consultants, an increase in the productivity of consultants and an increase in 
the synergies between lawyers and consultants. Even minor changes to the model 
illustrate the existence of multiple equilibria. The equilibrium level of lawyers and 
consultants either settles at 1 or roughly 3. As such multi-equilibria show, and to 
foreshadow a later result, similar levels of regulation and profits can correspond 
with very different levels of compliance expenditure.  
 
Productivities and costs of compliance advisors  
 
Lemma 1: The use of outsourced compliance relative to in-house counsel depends on a 
productivity effect and a cost effect )/( 11 −− ϑγλ bCaLR )/( cw ππ λλ .  
 
As shown in Figure 3, the optimal amount of in-house counsel hired (as a function of 
external compliance advisors) can settle in equilibrium at one of several points – 
depending on the model’s parameterization. Expressing such external compliance as a 
proportion of labour gives an expression similar to equation (12). Such a proposition 
increases as the productivity of in-house counsel increases and as their wages increase.  
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The  term clearly represents a type of productivity effect, as the 
optimal amount of each factor of production decreases with increases in productivity of 
the other (complementary or substitutable) factor of production. The
)/( 11 −− ϑγλ bCaLR
Rλ term represents 
the “shadow price of regulation.” In other words, how does an increase in the regulation 
level affect the amount of profits which financial service firms must spend for 
compliance activities? The cost term )/( cw ππ λλ  compares the relative cost of using in-
house lawyers compared with outside compliance advisors. Unsurprisingly, as lawyers’ 
wages increase, the optimal amount of outside compliance staff rises.  
 
Lemma 2: The optimal rule-of-thumb hiring of external compliance advisors consists of: 
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How much compliance services – abstracting from profits and complementarities – 
should financial service firms engage? We know that, at the equilibrium level, the change 
in compliance consulting spending with respect to changes in lawyer staffing changes by 
the same amount as the change in lawyer staffing to changes in compliance spending – or 
∂C/∂L=∂L/∂C.9 The first equation in lemma 2 shows that optimal, equilibrium level. The 
second part of the lemma sets C*/L* equal to 1 and then rearranges terms for C*. The 
third part of the lemma sets (θ−1) and (λ−1) equal to 1 and solves for C*. As found in 
other studies like Simmons and Dinnage (2011), factors like profits or quantity produced 
do not determine the optimum amount of lawyer-hiring and outsourcing. Given that we 
have abstracted from these issues for the time being, such a result is not surprising.  
 
Corollary 1: Holding everything else constant, and in the absence of profit and 
complementarities between factors of compliance, C/L>1 (and changes in ∂C/∂L>1) 
reflect higher productivity of consultants relative to in-house lawyers.  
 
How can we think about the way financial firms hire compliance consultants versus in-
house lawyers at the margin? As a thought experiment, we can increment L and C slightly 
and record that procedure with the Δ operator. Equation (13) shows the effect of 
incrementing the C/L ratio shows in equation (12) in this way. The numerator represents 
the effect of changing L slightly and the denominator represents the change in L of 
incrementing C slightly. Unsurprisingly, particularly where w and c either remain fixed in 
the short-term or reflect marginal productivities anyway, then the labour type mix reflects 
the regulation-tackling ability of each group of legal advisors.   
 
                                                 
9 In other words, the convex and concave curves in figure 3 should intersect at one point, where the 
marginal rate of substitution between in-house lawyers and outsourced compliance consultants equalizes.  
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The literature – exclusively from the law reviews – takes contradictory views on the 
productivity of in-house counsel relative to external advisors. Langevoort (2012) has 
argued that management tends to “capture” in-house lawyers, suggesting that b<a and 
θ<γ. Moreover, external legal service providers can specialise on a narrow service 
without the tugs of daily organisational minutae. At the other end of the debate, authors 
like Schwarcz (2008) argue that in-house lawyers tend to outperform their external peers 
due to more in-depth knowledge of the company and industry they work for. In a 
Schwarczian world, θ>γ due to the usual gains from specialisation. Both perspectives 
reflect the usual conflict in organisation theory about where the boundaries of the firm 
best lead to the specialisation which generates profits for the firm. If we observe 
financial services firms expanding their purchase of outside compliance services 
relative to expanding the work of in-house lawyers, we can deduce that such 
decisions reflect the gains from specialisation outside relative to insider the financial 
services firm.10 
 
Allowing for profits and complementarities between advisors 
 
What happens when we take profits and complementarities into account? Equation (21) 
shows the full expression for C and L – an expression basically unsolvable analytically. 
The solution to this part of the system yields equations (16) and (17).11 Unsurprisingly, 
the solution to this non-linear model basically says that compliance spending and 
spending on lawyers represent a function of the model’s parameters. More surprisingly, 
the solution for L* looks almost exactly like the solution for C* – except for the omission 
of exp((1/(θ-1)*ln(·/λb)). These terms basic scale down in-house lawyers as the 
productivity of compliance consulting rises.  
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10 A third case exists, where the two represent perfectly substitutable inputs. We discuss this in a later 
section.  
11 Because of this complexity, we divided the first order conditions to the optimization problem shown 
equation (8) into parts and described the nature of that solution.  
We can look how the expression behaves under certain circumstances in order to 
understand how compliance-related advisory relates to profits and complementarities 
between in-house counsel and outside compliance advisors. Setting θ and λ equal to 1 
gives us the much simpler case shown in equation (18) and equation (19). Solving for the 
optimum C and L under these specific assumptions leads to equations (20) and (21). 
Equation (22) shows the external compliance to in-house lawyer ratio which we can 
analyse more easily.  
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The intuition from equation (12) continues to hold. Increasing payments to compliance 
consultants tends to increase their numbers (as shown by comparing the parenthetical 
parts of equation (22). Such an effect likely results from an income effect, as resources 
fall for hiring legal advisors and making the less costly (on an overall basis) outsourced 
compliance staff more desirable.  
 
Lemma 3: Under the case of constant productivity, when financial firms increase their 
profits (and assuming they haven’t completely dealt with regulatory obligations), they 
increase their employment of C relative to L if  with a 
“wage” of 
)()1( 22 bccawwcwcb −>++−
)(
1)(4)(442
2
22
baw
wbawbabwbbb
−
+−+−+−−+−  
 
Unsurprisingly, employment of outside compliance professions increases to the extent 
they can “make more pages of compliance” (to continue with our analogy for compliance 
production in our model). To the extent b>a, financial firms want more C. At first glance, 
such a result may seem counter-intuitive. Given a fixed amount of regulation, firms may 
want to avoid compliance staff that act like a teacher’s pet, complying really, really well 
with obligations. Yet, in this case compliance refers to the amount of compliance 
achieved for each dollar spent on compliance activities. As described in Figure 4, 
financial firms in the post-2008 rush to hire compliance staff focused on hiring high 
productivity staff.12  
                                                 
12 For a description of this rush, see Deloitte. (2014). Demand for Compliance and Risk Skills Leaves a 
Talent Shortage. Wall Street Journal, 13 August. Available online at: 
http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/08/13/demand-for-compliance-and-risk-skills-leaves-a-
talent-shortage/  
 
 
Figure 4: The Case for Experienced Compliance Advisors 
 
What does “high productivity” mean in the context of financial services compliance? The 
post-2008 boom in compliance staff hiring – and the extensive internet chatter about 
desirable candidate individuals and companies for compliance roles – provides a glimpse 
at how these financial service firms define quality and productivity (basically the λ and θ 
in our model and to a lesser extent a and b). Experience lies at the heart of every 
discussion about the war for talented compliance staff. “’Now that risk is really briefing 
the board at every meeting, the risk officer has to be a much more senior level hire with 
more gravitas, with more influence and communication skills,’ said Lisa Zonino, a 
principal at recruiter Egon Zehnder in New York.”13 Recruiters and banks stress 
experience more than knowledge. Experience, rather than skills or knowledge, allows 
banks to comply quickly and cheaply. Thinking about compliance productivity as the 
ability to match a set R, we understand more clearly why employers put a premium on 
experience. Yet, as regulators move towards results-based and/or principles-based 
regulation, such a situation might change. Maybe we will one day talk about “better 
compliance.”  
 
 
The change in employment from changes in consulting fees comes from the ratio of 
consulting to lawyers. Let’s look again at equation (22) and only those parts dealing with 
changes in profits. Equation (23) shows the C/L again, using the Δ operator this time to 
denote changes in variables dealing with profits. As profits nudge up or down, the C/L 
ratio changes as shown. Under what conditions do financial firms hire more compliance 
consultants, relative to in-house lawyers? Equation (24) shows the effect of setting 
Δ(C/L)>1, and rearranging some terms. Equation (25) solves the solution for the 
quadratic function c. The equation basically says that the proportion of outsourced 
compliance services relative to in-house lawyer services increases at the margin when 
their productivity or lawyers’ wages increase. Under these very specific assumptions, as 
shown in Equation (25), the per-unit “wage” for compliance consultants simply gathers 
the terms of the quadratic equation and solves for c.  
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13 Armstrong, Rachel. (2012). Compliance Jobs See Major Salary Hikes As Tough Bank Regulations Boost 
Demand. Reuters, 25 November. Available online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/25/compliance-
jobs-salary-hikes_n_2189005.html  
We have noted previously that outsourced compliance consultants can increase demand 
for their services by raising their fees. Now that we have included profits and 
complementarities into our analysis, under what conditions does dC/dc>0?  
 
Lemma 4: Compliance service providers should get more business by lowering their fees 
when c< ((τ/2w)+1), or when these fees are less than the complementarities compliance 
hiring provides and when lawyers wages rise.  
 
At first glance, compliance consultants – in theory – look like they can raise demand by 
raising their fees when their fees are a bit higher than lawyers’ wages. Equation (26) 
rewritten and rearranges the similar terms from equation (21). As equation (27) shows, 
dC/dc>0 when these consulting fees are less than 1 plus a tiny bit more. Recall that we set 
many of the variables to 1 to obtain a tractable example. Thus, in this world where unity 
represents normal, these compliance consultants can get away with charging a bit more 
than in-house lawyers.14 Once we allow for profits, the more difficult to understand 
equation (28) governs the ability of compliance consultants to raise demand for their 
services by rising rates. Increased regulation makes raising rates easier, as does 
increasing complementarities between C and L and rising profits.15  
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Corollary 2: increases in consulting fees decrease demand for compliance consultants 
for small fee levels 
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We already showed above how we derived the condition whereby dC/dc>0 when 
c=f(RλR, lπ, π, τ). By backing up to (26) or by rearranging equation (28), we can solve for 
R. Such a solution implies that compliance consultants’ employment and fees increase 
when the financially equivalent value of regulation significantly exceeds financial 
firms’ profits, when lawyers’ wages fall, and when the effect of regulations on firms’ 
profits rises (becomes more harmful). 
                                                 
14 To take a simple numerical example, imagine that τ=0.6 and w=1. In this setting, c<1.3 in order that 
dC/dc>0. Naturally, as the hiring of more C increases, c will rise and financial will lose their zeal for 
hiring/replacing lawyers with outside compliance advisors.   
15 The term RλR represents the negative impact on profits of increasing regulation. Similar negative terms 
in the numerator and denominator become positive (a negative divided by a negative is a positive). Rising 
wages in the numerator swamp out those in the denominator, making increases in wages good for 
compliance consultants.  
 
 
Effect of complementarity on compliance advice and an equivalence hypothesis 
 
Maybe it doesn’t matter whether the financial services firm uses in-house lawyers or 
outside compliance advisory. Rosen (2008) has argued that consulting-style contracts 
have permeated corporations and “companies use lawyers just like they use any 
consultant” (1). Henderson (2011) has decried present-day lawyers as “project 
managers.” Rostain (2008) notes that the two groups, rather than simply replaceable cogs 
in international business, form a symbiotic relationship. Elimination of one group may 
hurt financial firm productivity. But (at the risk of over-interpreting the gaps in their 
argument) simply moving individual members from one group to the other should not 
affect financial firms’ productivity.  
 
If in-house counsel really does operate like an outside consultant, then the choice of L or 
C would not matter. Indeed, economic theory predicts that, at the margin and in the long-
run, factor payments and productivities balance out. Under what conditions does our 
model predict that in-house lawyers and outside compliance counsel are equivalent (and 
thus the choice between then irrelevant)? 
 
Lawyer-consultant equivalence holds only when all their payments and productivities 
are equal. Recalling from equation (12) that the hire of compliance relative to in-house 
counsel equals depends basically on each one’s productivity and cost. The condition 
rewritten in equation (28) holds true when w=c, b=a and when θ=γ. Interestingly, when 
the shadow price of regulation on profits equals zero, this also leads to indifference 
between in-house council and outside compliance advisors.  
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Even in the limited confines of our model, we know that lawyer-consultant equivalence 
does not hold. Equations (29) show the change in employment in each sub-sector, for a 
change in the complementarity between them. For a small change in the way they work 
together to engage in compliance activities, lawyers’ sensitivity to changes in such a 
complementarity is higher. When ∂C/dτ=∂L/dτ, the effect of a slight change in the 
complementarity between in-house lawyers and compliance consultants equally affects 
their employment. As equation (30) notes, compliance consultants’ employment change 
more with τ than lawyers when their productivity is higher. Such a condition only holds 
when compliance costs are relatively low (reflecting their low productivity). Figure (31) 
shows the expression slightly differently (as a series expansion). 
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Lemma 5: Equivalence between L and C is impossible in our model, ensuring the 
existence of a relatively more productive compliance sector.  
 
This statement naturally follows from the previous illustration. Equation (30) has one and 
one feasible solution at (c=1.2, b=2.4). Such a solution means that when complementarity 
rises between C and L (a condition necessary if the two sectors eventually become perfect 
substitutes), consultant’s productivity comes in at twice their payments. That mans that 
in-house lawyers must earn a higher wage (by the factor exhaustion theorem). At that 
point, a≈5.4. Lawyer’s productivity must come to double the compliance consultants’ 
productivity in order for lawyer and compliance consultant employment to change 
equally as they become better substitutes. Even from this simple example, we see that – 
in our model’s structure – lawyers and compliance consultants can never achieve 
perfect substitutability with w=c, b=a and when θ=γ. 
 
Our findings conform with real-world observations. Scholars like Rebitzer and Taylor 
(1995) documented lawyer’s excessively high wages a long time ago. In practice, in-
house lawyers assume part of the commercial risks of their employers, meaning they 
demand higher pay for higher risks that flat-fee external compliance advisors.16 Even a 
moment’s reflection notes that external compliance advisors must have higher 
productivity than in-house advisors, otherwise financial firms would not hire them. Our 
model also predicted Sako et al. (2013) findings about lawyer contracting in Fortune 500 
firms – many like JP Morgan and Bank of America are financial services firms. They find 
that firms prefer to hire external counsel unless some compelling complementarity or 
synergy in the firm makes hiring in-house counsel more attractive. In the language of our 
model, L/C rises when γ and a increase more than proportionally with changes b and θ.  
 
Corollary 3: As the differences in wages and productivities between lawyers and 
compliance consultants shrinks, [ ] [ ] [ ])1()1())(** min cRccWCL R −−−−−=− λλψππτ π . 
 
We can show that lawyer-consultant equivalence can not hold from another angle. We 
can make their factor payments and productivities vary only by discrepancy factor ψ  and 
then look at the effect of hiring as that discrepancy factor shrinks. Let’s flip equation (22) 
(so the number of in-house lawyers appears in the numerator), and assume that a>b, w<c 
and a=ψb and w=ψc. We use the simple solutions for L and C we found in equations (10) 
and (11) rather than in equations (15) and (16) in order to illustrate the intuition without 
becoming bogged down in math. After introducing the wedge ψ, equation (32) shows 
how many more in-house lawyers financial firms would hire relative to outsourced 
                                                 
16 Polinsky and Rubenfeld (2003) argue that such a risk-reward sharing arrangement would help align 
incentives, ensuring that lawyers work in their clients’ best interest. An employment contract clearly gives 
lawyers higher powered incentives than employment as an external law firm. Such an arrangement also 
raises their productivity significantly above a hourly-rate compensation scheme.  
compliance professionals. Equation (33) simply rearranges the previous equation, 
combining relevant terms. Equation (34) looks at how financial firms’ lawyer to 
consultant headcount changes as the wedge between their relative payments and 
productivities changes.  
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The difference between in-house lawyer hiring and outside consultant hiring basically 
consists of three effects. The term )( minππτ −   measures the extent of profits brought from 
complementarities between types of compliance advisors. The second term looks at 
external compliance consultants’ costs and the reverberation on profits. The third term 
looks at the effect of money not spend on compliance consultants dedicated to dealing 
with regulation. What happens with the wedge between in-house lawyers’ pay and 
productivity and their external compliance peers melts away? Equation (35) shows the 
difference between lawyer and consultant hiring depends on firms’ profit levels and the 
extent of regulation. Lawyers and compliance consultants are not functionally 
equivalent in our model due to profit (Sako) and regulation effects.17   
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As the wedge between lawyers and compliance consultants shrinks, compliance 
consultant fees reflect profit and regulation effects. Equation (36) shows that c 
approaches the way the regulations change profits and the way they change profits when 
the theoretically improbably C=L occurs. When L>C, c gets “twisted” by 
*)*(
4 CLRR −− τ
λ , 
reflecting the way that lawyers and compliance consultants differentially affect the way 
regulations affect financial firms’ profits.  
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17 Sako effects refer to the empirical findings of Sako et al. we cite earlier.  
Hiring compliance services in a competitive landscape 
 
What does competition among financial services firms and among legal services 
providers mean for the hiring and profitability of compliance outsourcing? Competition 
means that financial services firms would seek to maximise compliance service 
providers’ productivity or decrease payments w and c. As immediately obvious, higher 
profits will accrue to the firm which has higher productivities for a, b, γ, θ, or lower w 
and/or c. In our model, we show that financial firms will hire the “best” compliance 
advisory firm (with the highest productivity). We also show that in-house lawyers 
basically act like risk and innovation adverse copy-cats – waiting for innovations from 
external compliance consultants. They copy (with a lag) these innovations, along with the 
other compliance consultants who didn’t think of the innovation. To start our discussion, 
we consider the reasons why firms prefer external compliance consultants.   
 
Compliance advisors’ productivity in comparative perspective  
 
Lemma 6: Firms which prefer to hire compliance consultants over in-house lawyers will 
have higher profits by RR
R aRQLC
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Equation (37) shows the effect on profits of increasing the productivity of in-house 
counsel (on the left-hand side) and outsourced compliance staff (on the right-hand side). 
For an equal productivity improvement Δa=Δb, under our modelling strategy, in-house 
will always have a natural disadvantage. In-house counsel has such a disadvantage 
occurs because in-house lawyer’s productivity leads to costs internalized by the firm. 
As such, firms are indifferent to using in-house lawyers or outside compliance advisors 
only when in-house lawyer productivity is significantly higher than external compliance 
advisors. As shown in equation (38), after simply setting C=L, in order for lawyers’ 
productivity must equal compliance advisors productivity scaled by the cost parameter α 
(as applied over the volume of regulation R).  
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How much more productive do in-house lawyers need to be in order to affect firm profits 
the same way as external compliance consultants? Equation (38) shows the condition 
under which dπ/da=dπ/db. At that point, a change in either groups’ productivity has the 
same effect on profits. As shown, in-house lawyers’ productivity needs to increase by a 
relatively large factor to get the same profit punching power as compliance consultants. 
We can be reasonable sure that a<<b as RQ will represent a relatively large number, αR 
represents a small number. Even if we do not know the values for γ or L, we know these 
terms only make a smaller relative to b. Such a result leads us to corollary 4.  
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Corollary 4: To achieve a similar increase in profits, any change in external compliance 
firms’ productivity requires an increase of in-house counsel’s productivity by  
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What do we know about in-house counsel and their productivity in our model? According 
to the way competition drives innovation, financial firms have no incentives to invest in 
costly and risky in-house programmes aimed at increasing in-house lawyers’ productivity. 
Their optimal strategy consists of waiting until an innovation occurs in the external 
compliance sector. Once that occurs, equation (39) tells us how much in-house counsel’s 
productivity changes (by differentiating equation (38)). Equation (28) provides the 
condition when in-house lawyers’ represent perfect substitutes for outside compliance 
advisors (and visa-versa).  
   
Such a corollary relies on several styled facts about in-house counsel. First, in-house 
lawyers’ labour must provide a relatively undifferentiated stock of services. If they could 
differentiate themselves beyond commodity providers, an outside compliance option 
would not exist. Second, lawyer movement between financial service firms shows the 
relative similarity of activities in these companies. If tasks in various financial service 
firms were very highly specialised and difficult, such movement would prove very 
difficult. Third, folk wisdom tends to view in-house counsel as innovation-stifling.18 
While not necessarily buying this myth, we use it as the basis (right or wrong) of our 
assumption that compliance innovations come from outside the financial firm.  
 
Corollary 5: Financial firms will always prefer to buy compliance cost-saving 
innovations from C rather than hire (at the margin) external compliance companies, 
meaning that they will drive innovation for the entire financial services compliance 
advising sector.   
 
To prove that external compliance consultants drive regulatory innovation, we need to 
show that dπ/db>dπ/da and dw/da>dc/db. If this condition holds, then financial firms will 
obtain larger profits from “taking” innovations from C rather than L.19 Lemma 6 shows 
that dπ/db>dπ/da. What about dw/da>dc/db? The easiest way to show this consists of 
                                                 
18 Naturally, no rigorous academic studies have attempted to show whether in-house counsel does stifle 
innovation. For some views on the debate, see Kevin O'Keefe, How risk-averse lawyers stifle innovation, 
available at: http://outofthejungle.blogspot.hk/2007/11/how-risk-averse-lawyers-stifle.html. For a contrary 
view, see John Wallbillich, Risk Averse In-House Counsel And Other Myths, avaiilable at: 
http://www.wiredgc.com/2011/05/13/risk-averse-in-house-counsel-and-other-myths/  
19 It would also help if we could prove that L is more risk averse than C and that the stylized facts show that 
in-house lawyers rarely create new ways of complying with new regulations. Such a proof would take too 
long in the confines of our model. So we consider our exposition as a partial proof.   
equation (28).20 When lawyers and external compliance consultants have exactly the 
same productivities and costs, we know – by differentiating equation (28) that 
dw/da>dc/db only when Lγ-1>Cθ-1. We already showed that L>C for financial firms – 
both in theory and in practice. Thus financial firms will always prefer to buy compliance 
innovation (in the confines of our model) rather than develop it. Thus, in-house counsel 
increases its productivity through its interaction with outside compliance service 
providers.  
 
Financial firm competition and compliance productivity growth  
 
How do firms compete in our model? With i and Q fixed (determined outside of the 
model), financial firms can compete only by changing pay and productivity. We could 
specify how firms could use profits to invest in enhancing compliance productivity, or 
specifying a bargaining function used to drop w and c. Let’s choose an easier modelling 
strategy. Imagine a continuum of compliance consultants and their productivities 
described by equation (39). Think of these compliance advisors lined up along a 
continuum, with the first in the series having the lowest productivities (and thus lowest 
value-for-money).21 The second company has the second lowest productivity and so forth. 
In this formulation, C2 is better than C1 (and we denote this by the sign f ). Think of the 
line of these compliance companies extending into a mist-filled area, as new firms 
emerge “from the mist” with better compliance techniques.  
 
   (39) 
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We model the creation of new compliance innovations as follows. A new compliance 
consulting company emerges from the misty part of the continuum with probability ρ. In 
this case, ρ equals the fixed probability of inventing a new technique which either raises 
productivity or lowers costs at any point in time. Each innovation increases profits by a 
fixed amount δ. As shown in equation (38), we do not care whether the increase comes 
from the ability to produce more pages of compliance or from a drop in payments to 
compliance providers – or both. We can think of the shock as increasing b to b’ and 
working its way through several variables. As shown in equation (40), the benefits of 
such change over time lead to ρδt. If no innovation occurs, then πt+1=πt. 
 
E[πt+1] = ρ(πt+δ), for prob[bt+1=b’]= ρ               (40) 
 
What is the profit growth from such an innovation?  Equation (40) shows the total effect 
of an innovation shock condition for compliance consultants’ productivity. Acting 
                                                 
20 Equation (28) shows the condition we called lawyer-consultant equivalence.  
21 Imagine that pay is fixed in the short-run or determined in a larger compliance market, so that 
determination of compliance companies’ productivity determines their value for money. In other words, 
financial firms can not choose indifferently between a low c and low θ/b and a high c with a high θ and b. 
We describe C2 as “better” than C1 in the next sentence to avoid discussing whether they have a higher 
productivity or lower cost.  
through the C, c, and a channels (and we describe why the a-channel in a bit).22 To keep 
the model simple, we do not vary θ and γ. The first term looks at the way changes in 
compliance consultant’s productivity affects profits via consultant employment. The 
second term looks at the way productivity changes in b affect productivity changes in a. 
The third term looks at the way changes in consultants’ fees affect profits. These fees 
might go up (reflecting increased productivity) or down (reflecting the increased effective 
“supply” of compliance staff). The final term reflects a “direct effect” through a less-
binding regulatory constraint.  
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In order to get in-house lawyer productivity moving, we can assume that regulatory 
innovations “leak” across the boundaries of the firm, from the C working at financial 
firms to L.23 Equation (41) shows the way that the higher level of a affects the change in 
profits. The equation simply adds equation (38) to corollary 4 to find a’s effect on profits 
from equation (40). As we show in the next section, these changes in profits determine 
the extent to which regulators can increase regulations. Yet, if we want to model the way 
a changes over time, we can simply plug the new value of b into equation (38) – as 
shown in equation (42). By integrating over time, as shown in equation (43), we obtain 
an expression for the way that in-house lawyers’ productivity grows over time due 
to the competition between financial firms which drives outsourced compliance 
consultants to innovate.  
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        original level of a         increased by da/db                     change in profits (dπ/da) 
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22 To give a prelude, we vary profits by the way b changes a because we will argue for diffusion of the 
innovation from C to L.  
23 Several studies note that such learning represents a key vector by which firms import legal and 
compliance innovations (Allen & Overy, 2012).   
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The Interaction between Regulation and Compliance 
 
Regulators do not sit still. In our model, we view regulators as regulation-maximisers. 
Such a view of regulators may not be as bad it sounds. Acharya (2009) argues that 
regulators want to minimize systemic risk by having banks take into account the riskiness 
of others’ investment as well as its own – and the covariance between investments. Other 
authors refer to regulations governing leverage, capital adequacy and issues brought to 
the fore in new legislation like Dodd-Frank and the relevant EU legislation 
(Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Goodhart, 2005). Yet, a glance at our model (as 
shown in Equation (47))shows why modelling the complexity of rulemaking as simply 
viewing the “stock” of R rising. In our model, as the stock of regulation rises, more 
compliance staff are needed. The reason for such regulations is relatively irrelevant. We 
don’t need to model private or public risks. We only need to keep an eye on the stock of 
regulation to know what is happening in the wider economy. Similarly, for capital 
reserves, risk-adjusted capital adequacy, and other rules, their effect consists of raising 
the πmin in our model. These rules increase the amount of capital financial service firms 
must hold. In our simple model, this requires increasing profits (or spending less of them 
on compliance and other staff). In any case, simply raising πmin has the same effect as 
creating that wedge or buffer. The main point remains: regulators will maximise 
regulation subject to financial firms’ profit and manpower constraints.  
 
Imagine that regulators want to maximise regulation – under the view that more 
regulation leads to decreased systemic risk and other harms. If regulators maximise 
equation (8) with respect to regulation R, then the shadow price of this regulation on 
profits will equal the level of financial services provided Q, adjusted for in-house 
counsel’s productivity. Growing regulations significantly hurts financial firm 
profits.24 As shown more clearly by equation (44), regulation clearly changes as a 
function of the compliance productivity of in-house counsel. Equation (45) shows how R 
changes in response to changes in such productivity in the static case (before considering 
how such productivity changes in response to increasing productivity in the compliance 
sector). 
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24 The term –ln(a) in particular looks almost like a utility curve, sloping downward and going negative at 1.   
The Effect of Regulation on Compliance Advisory 
 
What does our model suggest about the effect of financial regulation on financial service 
firms’ profitability? We know from the extant literature that such an effect would be 
extremely tenuous at best (Barth et al., 2003). Our model matches this empirical 
observation. Going back to equation (8), differentiating firms’ profits with respect to 
regulation results in equation (46). As shown in equation (47), such profitability 
declines only for a relatively low level of regulation. Figure 5 shows the regions over 
which profits increase and decrease for various levels of R and Q. Let’s recall that R 
would likely vary between 0 and 1. If we thus wanted/expected a service level provision 
of Q=5, then R≈e-3 or R=.05 (roughly the level of France if we use the measure shown in 
Appendix I).  
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Figure 5: Profitability Over the Relationship Between Regulation and Output 
 
profits decreasing
profits increasing
The figure shows the relationship between regulation and output given the model described in the paper. 
We set (α-1)=1 and λR=6 and a=2 for the purposes of this simulation.  
 
 
Lemma 7: Regulation and increasing quantities of service provision are locked in an 
inexorable march forward such that 
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Before we look at the effect of regulation on compliance advisor hiring, we need to know 
the effect on overall financial services. Regulators have two basic constraints. First, the 
no profit rule says that regulators will crank up regulations up to the point where firms 
will not make profits. If dπ/dR >0, then R<R* (where R* represents regulator’s preferred 
level of regulations). If dπ/dR < 0, then R>R* and excess regulations choke off potential 
extra resources usable to comply with more regulations later. Second, the consumer 
amenity rule says that regulators will not want to chock off the provision of financial 
services Q. As such, regulators can choose any regulatory level such that dQ/dR >0.  
Equation (46) provides the basis for the first part of lemma 7. Regarding the second part, 
we can use the implicit differentiation theorem on equation (8) in order to arrive at 
equation (48). From there, rearranging terms provides the second part of lemma 7. Both 
parts of lemma 7 strictly imply that the level of regulation and financial services 
grow (or shrink) together.  
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What is the effect of an increase in regulation on hiring of compliance advisors in our 
simple model? We know that compliance spending increases when regulations increase if 
∂C/∂R>0. Equation (49) shows when this condition holds. Equation (50) shows after 
some manipulation while equation (51) shows the general solution for R. Understanding 
how so many variables and parameters vary as R and Q move can prove exceedingly 
difficult. Equation (52) shows the much simpler case when (1-α)=1, so that much of the 
equation washes out. In this simple case, the level of regulations must ensure that the 
profit destroying effect of regulations does not overcome firms’ ability to take on more 
compliance staff to deal with expanded regulations. As shown in equation (53), when the 
coefficient on a depends from 1, we see – as we already saw in equation (45) -- that the 
regulation level also takes the amount of financial services offered into consideration.  As 
an aside, the concave function W (or Lambert-W function) reflects diminishing gains 
from regulation.    
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     where W is the product log function 
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Corollary 6: Increasing regulations will increase the level of compliance consultant 
staffing such that C=q(R,Q | a,b,γ,λ,θ, L).  
 
From equation (17) we can depict equation (52) and from equation (49) we can depict 
(53). Basically, equation (52) says that compliance staffing depends on the level of 
regulation. Equation (53) says that regulations depend on the level of financial services 
offered. Ergo, compliance staffing depends on the amount of financial services that banks 
and other offer (in other words, their size).   
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We need look no further than equation (8) to show the relationship between firm size and 
compliance staff hiring. Confirming our intuition from equations (54) and (55), equation 
(56) shows that Q does not enter into this differential equation (except through an indirect 
effect on profits). As such, the change in C depends on the amount of C the firm has 
already hired – but not on Q.  
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The relationship between C and Q help us construct supply and demand graphs for 
compliance consulting services in several ways. First, regulations R “shift” out the way 
that C responds to Q. We show why and how such shifting takes place in Figure 6 in the 
next section. Second, increasing costs of external compliance advisors increases C’s 
response when financial firms increase quantities produced (and thus the volume of 
regulation they must comply with). Third, increased profits result in increased 
compliance activity (from the quantity produced channel) and decreased compliance 
activity (from the opportunity of not using not complementary, well substitutable in-
house lawyers). Equation (56) shows these effects – which we illustrate in Figure 6 below.  
 
Short-term and longer-term relationship between regulation and compliance  
 
What does compliance-related innovation and increasing regulation do to compliance 
markets? Innovation leads to increased supply of compliance services; whereas regulation 
needs to increased demand. Figure 6 shows the intuition of our math about the effect on 
the supply and demand for compliance services. Starting from equilibrium at point 1, we 
can assume for compliance service providers that increases in c lead to an increase in C 
(and thus resources for innovation). The figure shows the usual upward sloping supply 
curve, which we do not model explicitly in this paper.25 For financial firms, increases in c 
lead to decreased use of compliance firms’ services (following the usual budget 
constraint effects). A change in innovation results in an outward shift in compliance 
supply. Increases in regulation result in outward shifting demand – increasing compliance 
costs. The final equilibrium cost and level of compliance (noted as point 2) depend of the 
location and slope of these curves. The result comes to ever-more regulation and 
compliance capacity.  
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Figure 6: Increasing competition results in better
compliance services and thus more regulation
The figure shows the likely effect of increased competition among financial services firms (as the offer of 
more profitable compliance services). We show this as the shifting out of supply dCS/dc>0 for all C. 
Increased profits and productivity results in more regulation, as regulators never satiate in their regulatory 
demands. We show these demands as an outward shift in the demand curve dCD/dc>0. While C refers to 
the level of compliance services offered, actual employment falls due to increasing productivity. 
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Lemma 7: Lawyer productivity increases over time such that time-contingent lawyer 
productivity equals 
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From the static case, we can speculate about how regulation and compliance activity 
respond to each other over time (inter-temporally). Recall from equation (42) – and its 
integral in equation (43) -- that lawyers’ productivity grows over time, as a function of 
innovation shocks in the compliance sector. By integrating equation (23) we obtain in-
house lawyers’ productivity, which increases as a function of time and the size of the 
firm’s (or sector’s) lawyer pool. More regulation in this formulation encourages more 
compliance activity, while simultaneously decreasing lawyerly productivity.26   
                                                 
25 The reader can extend our model to explicitly allow for increases in c to affect C. One obvious way 
consists of making the probability of a compliance innovation ρ a function of changes in c. As c increases, 
the probability of an innovation increases, thus increasing C.   
26 Such a decrease could stem of lack of familiarity with new rules or with a general vexation cost, which 
makes lawyers need to consult more pages of laws. In the simple version of our model, da/dR = -(1-α)  
If lawyers’ productivity increases as a function of time, then so must regulation. Equation 
(57) shows the way that regulations change over time. Regulations change as financial 
firms’ profits change. These profits change as legal compliance advisors’ productivity 
(both in-house and external compliance advisors’) changes. Such productivity drifts 
upward over time at the rate ρt. Equation (58) slightly rearranges the previous equation, 
to show how 
•
r represents a function of . Equation (59) finds the level of regulation for 
the upward drifting level of compliance productivity.  
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Do any economic factors encourage an equilibrium convergence in compliance 
innovations and regulation? Figure 7 shows the results of a supposition (and no more than 
that) for the equilibrium growth in compliance innovation and regulation. Under our 
assumptions, regulators want to increase the growth of regulations as compliance service 
providers offer the innovations needed for financial service firms to deal with them 
(shown as curve RR in the figure). The compliance services sector clearly has incentives 
to speed up investments in new advice and technologies for offering that advice as 
regulatory adoption speeds up (shown as curve CA). In theory, regulators and 
compliance service providers should set the speed of their relevant activities to equal 
each other.  
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Figure 7: Theoretical response curves for financial services 
regulators and compliance service providers 
The figure depicts a supposition from our model which shows possible reaction curves for financial services 
regulators and compliance service providers.  Curve RR shows regulators’ preferred natural growth rate of 
regulations at r0. They increase the speed of new regulatory adoptions as innovation in the compliance sector 
increases. Conversely, compliance advisors have a natural rate of productivity growth (set by ρ). Given higher
rates of regulation, compliance companies find profitable opportunities to develop new services and other 
innovations. Factors from our model (and outside the model) determine the shape, slope and other features
of these curves. We suppose an equilibrium growth of both factors at (re, be)
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Financial Centre Competitiveness  
 
What happens if regulators regulate “out of bounds” (namely under or over-regulating 
given the extent of compliance capacity among financial firms? If regulators over-
regulate in the short-term (anticipating future compliance productivity growth), such 
over-regulation hurts profits, thereby making financial services firms uncompetitive vis-
a-vis foreign companies. If they under-regulate, they dull incentives needed to adopt cost-
saving compliance techniques – again hurting profits and competitiveness.27 Figure 8 
shows the effect on financial firms’ profits when regulators over and under regulate. 
Equation (60) shows the change in profits (Δπ), in-house lawyer employment (ΔL) and 
external compliance consultant employment (ΔC) when regulators under-regulate by 
R=R-ζ.  Counter-intuitively, legal advisor employment falls as regulation rises 
(because profits fall).   
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27 Such under-regulation also results in the well-known problems of increasing systemic risk and other 
social harms. We do not model these risks/harms in our model – thus we avoid any discussion of them.  
Figure 8: A Larger Compliance Sector Actually Makes Financial Services
Firms More Profitable
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The figure shows the effect on profits – and thus on the amount of compliance-related Advisors (in-house lawyers and 
external compliance consultants) when the regulator over-and-under regulates. For under-regulation, the size of the 
compliance advisory sector RISES, reflecting more profits used for more advice. Such a result defies folk wisdom that
more financial regulation represents a boon for lawyer-advisor employment. 
 
 
So what happens to a jurisdiction whose regulators allow financial service providers the 
change to make profits? Instead of making compliance-related innovation occur at 
random, lets assume that such innovation depends on the resources allocated to the 
compliance sector. Namely, replacing r in equation (40 leads to equation (61). Let’s 
further imagine two jurisdictions – “Labuan” and “Singapore.” Singapore has a higher C 
paid for from previous positive profits. As such, lawyer’s productivity grows faster (as 
shown by the difference between equations (63) and (62). Recall from equation (37) that 
profits grow at RR RQaL αγγ
λ −−  for each change in a. Thus, for the same profit level, our 
hypothetical Singapore will have higher profits if the cost saving effect of compliance 
staff exceed their costliness at work.  
 
E[πt+1] = ρ(πt+δ), for prob[bt+1=b’]=  yy CC
1
0;10 ωρω <<<<−              (61) 
[ ] [ RyRyLabuan LtbC
RQ
LCtbC
RQ
a
αα
ωω ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= −−• 5.'5.15.5.'1 1 ]    (62) 
[ RySingapore LtbC
RQ
a
α
ω ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= −• '11 ]        (63) 
 
Jurisdictions which “invest” in compliance staff (and thus innovation) can achieve greater 
competitiveness through higher profits and lower costs. Figure 9 shows the trade-off 
between two hypothetical jurisdictions, which we have labelled as Singapore and Labuan. 
In the Singaporean case, a larger compliance sector leads to the higher profits we showed 
in the previous paragraph. For Labuan’s regulation-to-profit trade off, a level of 
regulation RL corresponds to no profits (as shown at point 1). If Singaporean companies – 
with their larger compliance staffing – enter the Labuan market, they would earn the 
profits shown by the purple triangle by expending the resources needed to comply with 
a much small stock of regulations.  At point 3, they would earn no profits. Point 2 
shows the profits earned by these Singaporean financial services institutions if they h
to comply with some global average level of regulation R. For the moment, we can think
of R as a common set of regulation promulgated by the Financial Stability Board or the 
growing “acquis communautaire” of financial regulation. If Labuan’s regulatory 
agency increased regulations in this situation, they would bankrupt local finan
services firms and cause foreign firms to have competitive advantage.  
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Figure 9: A Larger Compliance Sector Actually Makes Financial Services
Firms More Profitable
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The figure shows the way that larger compliance employment in Singapore affects the trade-off between regulation
and profits. Past profits went to hire more compliance staff, whose absolutely level encourages faster compliance
productivity growth. Such faster growth – under certain circumstances – leads to more profits FOR EACH LEVEL
OF REGULATION. As a result, for regulation and Labuan’s level (RL), Singaporean companies can earn total profits
denoted by the purple triangle. For an average regional level of regulation R, Singaporean banks earn profits while 
Labuan banks lose profits. The figure thus shows how regulation can affect each jurisdiction’s competitiveness. 
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jurisdictions compete with those from lightly regulated ones? Figure 10 shows a 
graphical version of the argument – which we use to save us from using constrain
dynamic optimisation and make this already long paper longer. In this figure, we show
Singaporean and Labuan financial firms constrained by a common set of regulations. 
Singaporean financial firms made a profit at this regulation level (thanks to larger 
compliance staffing). Labuan companies lose money, due to smaller compliance st
As Labuan companies lose money, they must fire compliance staff – reducing their 
productivity further. We show such productivity loss as shifting the Labuan π-R curv
the left. Point 5 represents the new break-even point for Labuan firms.  
 
 
Figure 10: A Larger Compliance Sector Actually Makes Financial Services
Firms More Profitable
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The figure shows the possible effect on financial service firms’ profits of regulatory harmonisation.  At point 1, Labuan 
companies make no profits. Singapore financial firms would earn large profits noted at point 2 for this level of 
regulation. At a global or regional harmonised regulation level R, Singapore financial firms would earn profits shown by 
point 3 while Labuan firms would lose profits as shown at point 4. Yet, negative profits mean a shrinking compliance 
sector for Labuan, further shifting in Labuan’s π-R trade-off. Labuan will eventually need to isolate its banking sector 
and apply differential regulations. 
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Regulators’ task consists of keeping regulations loose enough so that financial firms can 
earn the profits needed to expand their compliance departments, while still encouraging 
compliance-related innovation. Such a condition has entered into folk wisdom among 
bank regulators, in a version which we call the Menon Hypothesis.28 If the data show 
support for the hypothesis, then regulators play an important role in promoting the 
competitiveness of their financial services firms.29  In some cases, like in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, regulators need to slow down reform in order to give their financial firms time 
to become “compliance competitive” (Le Lesle et al., 2014). In other cases, they need to 
speed up reform to discourage market entry by financial firms at a compliance-cost 
disadvantage (Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). 
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28 The Menon Hypothesis comes from the Executive Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, who 
in 2001, argued for an expanded role for financial regulators on the grounds that such regulation actually 
helped improve financial firms’ profitability. See Ravi Menon. (2001). Sound Regulation as a Source of 
Competitive Advantage. Speech at the Asian Banker Summit. Available online at: 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/speeches-and-monetary-policy-
statements/speeches/2001/sound-regulation-as-a-source-of-competitive-advantage--21-mar-2001.aspx  
29 We present the theory in this paper, and discuss empirical issues in a subsequent (follow up) paper.  
 
Policy Options for Regulators  
 
The data appear to support the spiralling interaction between regulators and financial 
services firms. Authors like Morrison and White (2009) shows that investors prefer 
“better regulated” (which in their formulation actually means more regulated) 
jurisdictions. Given our model, policymakers, financial services firms and their legal 
advisors have 5 options for dealing with the ever-spiralling interaction between 
competition, productivity and regulation. The first option (encouraging co-operation 
between compliance service providers) seems unlikely to succeed, while the other 4 
options appear more fruitful.  
 
Policy Option 1: Promote coordination between compliance firms themselves and with 
regulators  
 
In our model, ever increasing compliance innovation leads to more regulation. Such a 
view echoes other scholars who have argued that regulators need to protect banks from 
themselves – and their excessive competition (Beck, 2008). Explicit agreements between 
compliance solutions providers would likely run foul of various countries’ competition 
(antitrust) authorities. Compliance service providers could also meet with regulators, 
encouraging them to forgo increasing regulation. Such meetings would allow compliance 
service providers the opportunity to reduce the introduction of innovations below the ρt 
level, in case they worry regulators will over-regulate. However, regulators in most 
jurisdictions remain relatively isolated from market participants. Thus, this option 
appears exceedingly unlikely to work in practice.  
 
Policy Option 2: Set up government-sponsored exchanges of compliance “best practice”  
 
Compliance innovation occurs because such innovation results in a bump in financial 
service firm profitability. If regulators could somehow encourage the gains of such 
innovation, without encouraging the profitability such innovation engenders, then a 
regulatory response would be less forthcoming. The best strategy would consist of 
activities which break the link between  and •b π . Figure 11 shows the relevant variables 
in financial firms’ profit equation and the way the sharing of best practice can forestall 
regulatory action.  
 
Figure 11: Best practices and its effect on financial firm profitability 
 
variable Description 
w increasing dw/dπ would decrease π and thereby make regulation less 
affordable. Such changes can occur from increased lawyer productivity 
or simply increased bargaining power 
a/γ increasing da/db would only work if wages rose, thereby decreasing 
profits. So lawyer productivity needs to visibly increase. 
τ increasing complementarity in our model has the effect of decreasing 
profits  
c Increased fees for compliance advisors helps keep down profits, and thus 
firms’ power to comply with expanding regulations.  
α as structural regulatory burdens rise, such burdens help to keep profits 
down. A best-practice (like CSR) which everyone adopts will create a 
burden for all.   
Q If compliance solutions help reduce financial firms’ ability to offer 
services, this will keep down profits, thus discourage regulation. 
 
Policy Option 3: Tie regulators’ incentives to financial service firms’ long-run, risk-
adjusted, Pareto-enhancing profitability  
 
Regulation enters financial firms’ profit maximisation function in two places – as a 
constraint determined by compliance resources and as a quantity-dependent cost. 
Regulation harms profits – thus regulators have to walk the knife-edge between 
encouraging and discouraging profits. They must simultaneously reduce profits as much 
as possible, while still not chocking off the profits that makes compliance possible at all.  
 
Most financial regulatory authorities have no mandate for ensuring the profitability of the 
financial services they regulate. Most have the mandate to ensure an “orderly” market, 
however they define it. As Garten (1989) noticed almost 20 years ago, regulators’ 
implicit support for banking profits in the pre-2008 period lead to a new regulatory 
approach. Even in banking’s “deregulatory age”, regulations continued to ratchet upward. 
Using the long-run, risk-adjusted profitability of the banking sector as a maximand (along 
with consumer surplus) would help prevent ever-spiralling regulation. Naturally, if 
regulators “help” banks earn more profits, such help shouldn’t come at the expense of 
depositors, investors, other customers and so forth.  
 
Policy Option 4: Engage in regular regulatory guillotine exercises 
 
Following this option, regulators would periodically review regulations and eliminate 
unnecessary, repetitive and otherwise harmful regulation. In practice, much expansion in 
R comes from regulatory experimentation. To the extent that regulators can achieve the 
same social outcomes with a lower R (and thus higher banking profits), they should do so. 
In practice, regulators probably care little about making regulations better. Regulators do 
not engage in “turf wars” which would make policy better (Weinberg, 2002). 
Competition between regulators would probably not lead to regulatory simplification – 
particularly when regulators seek to expand their regulation to harmonize with foreign 
regulation in the era of “home run” regulation (Wilcox, 2005). Because regulators need a 
strong reputation for the various facets of their work, deregulation may not come swiftly... 
if at all (Boot and Thakor, 2006). A regulatory guillotine (or review and “chopping” of a 
wide-range of relatively useless regulations) would increase bank profitability 
significantly. Such a chopping – according to our model – would lead to large increases 
in lawyers’ and compliance consultants’ wages.30 Yet, such a move would discourage 
compliance innovation and anyway seems unlikely.  
 
                                                 
30 Such a result stems from our first and second constraint, which requires the output of C and L and their 
factor payments to equal R and their factor payments to equal revenues.  
Policy option 5: Encourage the pre-conditions for the Menon Hypothesis 
 
As postulated by the Menon Hypothesis, expanding financial regulation promotes the 
competitiveness of a financial centre’s institutions if lawyers’ productivity exceeds the 
cost of compliance and when financial regulation does not harm financial 
firms’ abilities to earn the profits they need to hire compliance staff. Requiring non-
labour intensive methods of compliance can help boost lawyers’ productivity. 
Encouraging regulations which do not scale (depending on the level of financial services 
offered) can also help. Tax incentives can also treat payments to in-house counsel and 
outsourced compliance consultants “better” than other business expenses. Such treatment 
may include providing tax credits for particular types of compliance activities.  
R
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Conclusion 
 
The compliance industry looks like the clear-cut winner in regulators’ drive to regulate 
their financial sectors. In this paper, we model the link between regulation and the 
demand for compliance consulting and related advisory services. In our simple model, we 
show how financial services firms’ profits depend on the way they use in-house lawyers 
as opposed to (or in combination with) external compliance consultants. We show that 
compliance legal advisory can help reduce costs and boast financial service firms’ profits 
in the short-run. In the longer run, competition among financial service firms leads to the 
emergence of new compliance solutions. These solutions lower compliance costs and 
thus allow financial services firms to deal with an expanding amount of regulation. Such 
expanding regulation imposes costs on financial firms. Yet, snowballing regulation also 
provides incentives for creating the new compliance innovations which have made 
companies like Thompson Reuters, Capco and others large and important players in the 
financial services sector.   
 
The relationship between financial regulation and compliance-related legal advisors helps 
determine a jurisdiction’s competitiveness. A growing compliance and legal sector can 
make financial firms more internationally competitive. Yet, such growth can also 
encourage regulators to increase costly regulation – even if financial services firms’ 
compliance capacity does not yet exist. Tying regulator’s objectives to financial firms’ 
profitability can help reduce the extent of ever-increasing regulatory burdens. Engaging 
in regular deregulation exercises and encouraging the sharing of compliance best-practice 
can also help. In the end, the growth of financial firms’ profits and regulation depends on 
the extent to which competition among financial firms leads to compliance-related 
innovation.  
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Appendix I: A Numerical Measure of Regulation  
 
Relatively simple arithmetic operations can establish a scale on which to evaluate the 
similarity or difference between countries’ banking (and securities) regulations. Such a 
measure would allow compliance services providers to estimate the amount of work and 
type of work clients in a new market. For example, do Thai banks need advice closer to 
Hong Kong’s or to Singapore’s? The numerical measure we provide in this appendix 
helps them answer this question. Such a measure might also go some way as measure for 
R (the stock of regulations) in our model.  
 
Equation (I) shows one possible way of mapping the complex vector values for a 
country’s financial regulation into a scalar number. Let Xi equal the factor loading along 
one of four orthogonal dimensions we found using the Cihak et al. (2013) database for 
financial regulation. As described in this paper’s main body text, the procedure compares 
a j-element column vector of values ranging from 0 to m for each country i with other 
countries. Each country receives a score along each of these four orthogonal dimensions, 
depending on the extent to which the variance between various elements of r correspond 
to each other. Such a mapping assigns weights to each of four factors or dimensions 
which range between minus 1 and 1.  
 
We can compute a relatively simple measure of financial regulations as follows. As 
shown in equation (I), we can simply add the absolute value of the factor loadings for 
each of the four dimensions. We use absolute values between negatives and positives 
emerge from the multidimensional scaling process only as a mathematical construct – 
with negative elements assigned to dimension 1 and position to dimension 2. Equation (II) 
shows the procedure used to scale the resulting sums onto the unit line.  Figures Ia, Ib and 
Ic show the actual results of such a mapping and scaling on each country’s banking 
regulation. According to the mapping we used, a country receives a lower regulatory 
score (R) the more similar the country’s banking regulations are to Germany’s.31 
According to this scaling, Bulgaria’s banking laws represent the furthest (most dissimilar) 
to the majority of other countries’ laws.  
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Such a measure differs from Barth et al. (2013) index in that this measure does not try to 
subjectively decide whether specific values of rij represent more or less stringent 
                                                 
31 According to this method of scaling the data, Germany most represents the prototypical country. In our 
multidimensional scaling procedure, 87 out of 118 countries had the largest absolute value of χ1.  
regulatory requirements. This measure differs from “outcome based” measures like those 
used in Quinn and Inclan (1997) in that it measures regulations directly, rather than the 
effects of these regulations on capital ratios, concentration and other variables.32  
 
 
Figure Ia: Distance from Major Financial Centres’ Banking Regulation 
(regulatorily “close” to major markets) 
 
Country Score  Country Score  Country Score 
Germany 1.00  Kazakhstan 0.68  Venezuela 0.57 
USA 0.97  Ireland 0.66  Mexico 0.57 
China 0.96  Australia 0.65  Russia 0.57 
France 0.96  Gibraltar 0.65  Malaysia 0.56 
Austria 0.94  Lebanon 0.65  Virgin Islands 0.56 
Jersey 0.92  Bahrain 0.63  Hungary 0.55 
Luxembourg 0.88  Slovakia 0.63  Trinidad 0.55 
Denmark 0.85  Cyprus 0.62  Canada 0.55 
United Kingdom 0.84  Croatia 0.61  Latvia 0.54 
Ukraine 0.83  Lithuania 0.59  Netherlands 0.53 
Lichtenstein 0.78  Puerto Rico 0.58  Estonia 0.52 
Italy 0.76  Switzerland 0.58  Jordan 0.50 
Norway 0.72  Portugal 0.58  Egypt 0.50 
Finland 0.71  Colombia 0.58  Bangladesh 0.50 
  
Figure Ib: Distance from Major Financial Centres’ Banking Regulation 
(regulatorily between the major and periphery markets) 
 
         
Country Score  Country Score  Country Score 
New Zealand 0.49  Myanmar 0.38  Macao 0.33 
Belgium 0.49  Hong Kong 0.38  Guyana 0.32 
Cayman Islands 0.48  Korea 0.38  Morocco 0.32 
Thailand 0.48  Sri Lanka 0.38  Nepal 0.31 
Indonesia 0.44  Dominican Rep. 0.37  Slovenia 0.31 
Mauritius 0.44  Maldives 0.37  Yemen 0.30 
India 0.43  Surinam 0.37  Peru 0.28 
Isle of Man 0.43  Vanuatu 0.37  Brazil 0.28 
Spain 0.41  Bosna-HZ 0.36  Panama 0.27 
Tajikistan 0.39  Kosovo 0.35  Seychelles 0.26 
                                                 
32 See Quinn (1997) for a further discussion of the way economists and political scientists measure the way 
financial regulations affect macroeconomic variables and even attributes of political structure by looking at 
the effects of such financial regulations on the levels of key banking and securities outcomes. In contrast, 
authors like Beltratti and Stulz (2009) look at the way that these proxies for regulations impact on 
macroeconomic variables.  
Romania 0.39  Tunisia 0.34  Gambia 0.26 
Burkina Faso 0.39  Fiji 0.34  Montenegro 0.26 
   Belize 0.34  Kyrgyz 0.25 
  
Figure Ic: Distance from Major Financial Centres’ Banking Regulation 
(regulatorily far the major markets) 
 
     
Country Score  Country Score  Country Score 
Bhutan 0.25  Poland 0.19  Uganda 0.13 
Philippines 0.25  Nicaragua 0.19  Paraguay 0.12 
Kenya 0.24  Samoa 0.18  Turkey 0.12 
Guernsey 0.24  Ecuador 0.17  Oman 0.12 
Qatar 0.24  Costa Rica 0.17  El Salvador 0.12 
Iceland 0.24  Chile 0.17  Uruguay 0.12 
Israel 0.23  UAE 0.16  Greece 0.11 
Honduras 0.23  Cook Islands 0.16  Argentina 0.10 
Syria 0.23  Kuwait 0.15  Belarus 0.10 
Jamaica 0.23  South Africa 0.14  Malta 0.07 
Armenia 0.22  Pakistan 0.14  Taiwan 0.07 
Moldova 0.22  Serbia 0.14  Bulgaria 0.00 
Madagascar 0.22       
Guatemala 0.20       
 
  
 
